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Abstract 
 
Drawing on some theoretical stimuli provided by cultural sociology, the article will show how, when it 
comes to discussing the identity-creating function of memory, focusing the analysis on the relationship 
between representations of the past and the process of identity building is not enough. In addition, it is 
necessary to evaluate whether it is appropriate to include the consciousness (that here is assumed to be 
increasingly widespread) of the socially constructed nature of each identity in the concept of memory. In this 
case, memory would play an ambivalent role regarding identity. On the one hand, memory would represent a 
vital resource for its construction and retention, while on the other it could constitute an element making 
actors aware of the artificiality of their selves, therefore ending up by playing a destabilizing role. Some 
consequences of this way of conceiving memory are discussed with regards to the general process of 
forgetting and the so-called ‘ethics of memory’. 
Key words: Collective memory, flow, forgetting, performance, social memory 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Memory studies in the last two decades have been characterised by a large degree of diversity in 
terms of approaches and issues, developed within a wide variety of different fields. When 
attempting to provide a critical overview of the available literature, it is impossible not to feel 
overwhelmed by the seemingly limitless output, even when the field is restricted to the social 
sciences. Indeed, as Jeffrey Olick has noted (2008, p. 26), while it was still possible to carry out 
bibliographical reconnaissance work on the theme of memory with a realistic hope of being 
exhaustive ten or fifteen years ago, any such attempt now would involve a mountain of work big 
enough to discourage even the most dogged researcher. In addition to the startling number of 
articles, books, collections of essays and specialist magazines, one is also struck by the disparate 
range of topics linked to memory. A quick JSTOR search on articles published in the last twenty 
years whose keywords include memory, collective memory or social memory produces an endless 
list of results ranging from the ethnography of commemorative events to theoretical analyses of 
evil, historical sociological studies of martyrdom and research into the expression of gratitude 
within friendship networks. To this end, while reflecting on the pandemonium which is now an 
intrinsic part of this field of study, Olick defined collective memory research as a 
‘nonparadigmatic, transdisciplinary, centerless enterprise’ (Olick and Robbins, 1998: 106), 
characterized by a chaotic process whereby work carried out in some subjects often does not take 
into account the relevant output in certain others.  
The (heroic) efforts to provide a critical review of available literature (Cossu, 2008; Olick, 
1999a, 2008; Olick and Robbins, 1998; Zelizer, 1995; Zerubavel, 1996) have focused on the search 
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for a dominant motif in this many-sided fragmented branch of study and appear to have found a 
consensus regarding the concept of identity. Indeed, there seems to be a more or less tacit 
agreement among scholars concerning the identifying function of memory. Put more explicitly, if 
memories of the past are organised into structures which can convey a sense of continuity in an 
increasingly changing present, they constitute an indispensable anchorage device for the self, 
thereby becoming the main source for formation of its identity (Giesen, 2006: 109; Misztal, 2003: 
133)1.  
The following study attempts to question this nexus. By drawing on certain theoretical stimuli 
from cultural sociology (Alexander, 2003; Alexander and Smith, 2003), in particular the branch 
which is most sensitive to the issue of cultural pragmatics (Alexander, 2004a; Alexander and Mast, 
2006; Giesen, 2004a, 2006; Rauer, 2006), the essay will try to show that when addressing the 
identifying function of memory, it is not sufficient to limit one’s analysis to the relationship 
between representations of the past and processes of identity formation, maintenance and 
transformation. In addition, the appropriateness of including tacit awareness of the socially-
constructed nature of each form of belonging within the concept of memory needs to be assessed. 
In this case, memory performs an ambivalent function with regard to identity-making processes. 
While, on one hand, it constitutes an essential resource in terms of construction and maintenance, 
on the other hand it could be an element capable of making actors aware of the artificial nature of 
their self, thereby ultimately carrying out a destabilising role. 
 
 
2. The search for success: memory and performance 
 
Broadly speaking, the value of memory in identity formation seems to have been recognised by 
most sociological thinking. However, the scope of this essay does not allow me to move on to a 
close examination of such a vast well-structured scientific output; it is therefore sufficient to 
remember in general that depictions of the past are often defined in terms of complex identification 
devices2. This seems to hold true both in cases where memory focuses on a glorious past and where 
it reflects a difficult or even traumatic background (Alexander, 2004b;  Giesen, 2004a, 2004b;). 
The identity-making potential of memory becomes patently visible when representations of the past 
developed by a specific group are included in the resources of the wider society of which it forms 
part (Alexander, 2002). However, they retain their vitality (although in the background) even in 
cases where the requested recognition is denied (Foucault, 2003; Heller, 2001; Hodgkin and 
Radstone, 2003). Furthermore, the identifying function of memory also seems to pass unscathed 
through the traditional methodological hiatus that afflicts social theory (Olick, 1999a). In the end, 
both approaches that start from individualist positions (Locke, 1975/1690)3 and those which view 
                                                          
1
 The distressing downward trend which can be triggered by lack of memory is expertly illustrated by Oliver Sacks 
(1985) through the disturbing figure of the Lost Mariner. A pathological absence of memory made this man a castaway of 
the present, an individual – Sacks writes – completely imprisoned in an ever-changing senseless moment; reduced to a 
kind of human nonsense, a mere succession of entirely unrelated impressions and events without any focus. 
2
 The choice of the term identification is not a random one. By adopting it, I have tried to make use of the reflections by 
Brubacker and Cooper (2000: 14-21) regarding the vast inherent ambiguity in the concept of identity and take on board 
their suggestion to replace it with more precise expressions such as self-understanding, commonality, connectedness, 
groupness and, indeed, identification. I have opted for the latter because of a series of reasons. First of all, it accurately 
underlines the dynamic aspect which distinguishes any formation of identity. To this end, wherever possible I shall speak 
of  processes of formation and maintenance of identity rather than simply identity. This stresses the fact that in reality an 
identity is never definitively owned, as it requires constant efforts of revision. Furthermore, if we assume that the above 
is true, the concept of identification automatically underlines the socially-constructed nature of every identity. Indeed, if 
identity is something which requires effort (whether from those who wish to gain it, those who want to impose it on 
others or even those who wish to rid themselves of it), it follows that there is a certain distance between the individual 
and any devices used to symbolize it, including representations of the past. Finally, as Brubacker and Cooper go on to 
suggest (2000, p. 17), the term identification does not only allude to a classification process (somebody who is recognised 
and wants to be recognised on the basis of certain characteristics), but is also the bearer of psychodynamically-motivated 
meaning, which is able, as the article will go on to show, to highlight the innate emotional component in every identity. 
3
 On Locke and his vision of the relationship between memory and identity see Paul Ricoeur, (1993: 214-217, 2003: 144-
154). 
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the phenomenon of memory as a collective entity (Halbwachs 1925, 1950) share the idea that 
memory resources (whether personal or shared at group level) correspond as it were to the guiding 
principle of structures of the individual and/or collective self. 
However, the memory-identity equation is not without problems. It is well-known that a 
traditional topos in the sociology of memory involves seeing processes of selection of the past 
implied in all practices that constitute identity. The only memories which are remembered and 
placed at the centre of the self are those few which are most in keeping with the identity-making 
requirements of the present. If this is true, it means that every process of identification involves 
doses of memory and oblivion in equal measures (Namer, 1987:  73-9).  
For example, individuals are often inclined to keep their past political ideas and allegiances 
hidden from others and most of all from themselves when they no longer hold them, as they are 
considered to be incompatible with their current image. In the same way, parents do not mention 
certain ‘awkward’ episodes from their youth to their children to avoid transmitting ideas of the 
family which clash with their educational goals (Connerton, 2008: 53). Similarly, with a rapid 
change of perspective, the process of forgetting is also found at the centre of national identities. 
Indeed, if it is true that the identity of a nation is sustained by imagining an original ethnic, 
linguistic and cultural unit, which is capable of transcending all other forms of belonging that may 
exist within it, all episodes which could in some way question this presumed unity need to be 
systematically erased from the ‘national biography’4. Therefore, in the United States the 1861-65 
conflict has been ‘pedagogically’ reinterpreted as a civil war rather than the historically more 
acceptable terms of a war between two sovereign states. In the same way, in Great Britain William 
the Conqueror has been positioned in the role of ‘father of the nation’ rather than the probably 
more appropriate moniker of Norman invader (Anderson, 19912)5. The collective depiction of a 
past in order to maintain identity therefore goes hand-in-hand with a reassuring moment of equally 
collective amnesia (Connerton, 2009: 49; Misztal, 2003:  17)6. 
In any case, I am not about to undertake a close examination of the processes of the inhibition 
and repression of memories. It is sufficient to remember this with regard to what Primo Levi wrote 
in The Drowned and the Saved (1989): when the reality of the past clashes with the needs of the 
present reality, There are those who lie consciously, coldly falsifying reality itself, but more 
numerous are those who weigh anchor, move off, momentarily or forever, from genuine memories, 
and fabricate themselves a convenient reality. What happens is that these fantasies merge with 
reality as a result of being repeated as if they were true, making it more or less impossible, even for 
their creators, to distinguish between truth and falsehood in the realm of memory; it is no longer 
clear which events really happened and which were completely invented. 
Nevertheless, as psychologists have been wont to point out (Singer and Conway, 2008; Wessel 
and Moulds, 2008), a certain degree of care needs to be adopted when referring to alterations in 
memory. Indeed, we are almost automatically inclined to believe that these are synonymous with 
definitive losses or irreversible tampering. Today, however, scholars seem to favour the hypothesis 
whereby the ability to falsify mnemonic information immutably is extremely improbable, both at 
                                                          
4
 The analysis carried out by Anderson (19912) on Ernst Renan’s renowned conference, Qu’est-ce qu’une nation? is 
enlightening in this respect. Anderson commented on the following extract: ‘Or, l’essence d’une nation est que tous le 
individus aient beaucoup de choses en commun et aussi que tous aient oublié bien des choses […] Tout citoyen français 
doit avoir oublié la Saint_Barthélemy, les massacres du Midi au XIIIe siècle’ (Renan, quoted in Anderson, 19912:  199). 
To this end Anderson points out that by using expressions such as ‘St. Bartholomew’s night’ or ‘the massacre in the 
Midi’, Renan manages to include both victims and tormentors as part of a French identity, even though at the time they 
could not have felt any affiliation with it as they were members of different cultural, religious and linguistic groups: 
‘Since we can be confident that, left to themselves, the overwhelming majority of Renan's French contemporaries would 
never have heard of ‘la Saint-Barthélemy’ or ‘les massacres du Midi,’ we become aware of a systematic historiographical 
campaign, […], to ‘remind’ every young Frenchwoman and Frenchman of a series of antique slaughters which are now 
inscribed as ‘family history’’ (Anderson 19912: 200-201). A historical text presents itself as an extremely powerful agent 
of oblivion at the same moment that it aims to reawaken a memory.  
5
 For analysis of the highly intricate network of historical genealogy deriving from the memory of the conflict between 
the Saxons and Normans see Foucault (2003: pp. 87 et seq).  
6
 Staying silent about certain episodes is clearly not the same thing as forgetting them. Nevertheless, maintaining a 
systematic level of silence about an event shows an evident desire to erase any memory of it, and may even have the 
long-term concrete effect of drowning it in oblivion (Connerton 2008: 67; Margalit 2002: 193). 
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an individual and collective level. While on one hand the most recent neuroscientific discoveries 
are related to the functioning of the brain, on the other hand the constant improvements made to 
digital filing systems offer more blurred complex visions based on the distinction between 
availability and accessibility (Singer and Conway, 2008: 280). It is said that the information itself 
is always available; what changes is the level of accessibility to it. In other words, it is not the 
memories themselves which are lost or corrupted but rather the stimuli needed to make people 
conscious of them (again). This does not mean, however, that it is not possible to encounter 
alternative traces or inducements, perhaps unconsciously, which can trigger sudden states of 
reminiscence. Therefore, from this point of view the ongoing threatening underlying presence of 
awkward destabilising memories, which might suddenly be activated again in all their devastating 
potential, leads us to ponder the existence of a second function of memory in clear opposition to its 
identifying role7.  
The words of Primo Levi (1989) quoted above prompt a second different observation with 
regard to the relationship between memory and identity. In order to make this, however, it is 
necessary to discuss a distinction between two expressions that are often used as synonyms in 
literature, but in reality refer to different realities, namely the concepts of collective memory and 
social memory. Gerard Namer addressed this matter in the past in his powerful critical rereading of 
Halbwachs’s collected works. He positions collective memory and social memory on two clearly 
distinct levels. Collective memory includes representations of the past which sustain the collective 
identities of social groups. It is a form of memory which is alive, or rather brought to life by (and 
in) the interaction of groups which use this type of representation to mark out and safeguard the 
boundaries that distinguish their identity from that of other groups. On the other hand, social 
memory takes shape as the set of Pathosformeln which make up the entire imagination (conscious 
and unconscious) of a given society (Assmann, 2007: 524). In a more accessible way, Namer has 
noted that social groups and their identities are subject not only to change but also to crisis, break-
up and death. However, as we have already seen, no element of the past seems to be lost from sight 
completely. While much of what has come to pass may seem to have sunk into oblivion, it can just 
as easily be brought back to the surface by casual circumstances or more conscious plans. Identities 
from the past may be reappropriated in a process that involves being experienced anew, 
transformed and reinvented by those in the present. For these reasons, social memory is something 
which the French sociologist positions as much ‘on the other side’ as ‘on this side’ of collective 
memory. It is ‘on the other side’ because a specific representation of the past becomes a social 
memory resource when the groups that brought it to life disappear, while it is ‘on this side’ because 
Namer (1991: 96-101; 1987: 21-31) seems to suggest that collective memories are basically formed 
as a result of creative reworkings of the content of social memory.  
The latter can be used as a starting point to develop the concept of social memory further. In 
Namer’s register, as we have just seen, he describes a form of symbolic reserve which groups in the 
present draw on to carry out the processes of the development, maintenance and communication of 
their identity. When considering this formulation, one connection that inevitably springs to mind is 
Jeffrey Alexander’s definition of ‘background representations and foreground scripts’ (2004a: 530) 
as part of the development of his theory of cultural pragmatics8. However, before providing a 
detailed explanation of what these two expressions refer to, it should be stated that the theory of 
cultural pragmatics is an analytical attempt aimed at identifying the necessary elements for 
individuals and social groups to manage to acquire and transmit their own identity. What he calls 
performance consists of a process through which actors, individuals and groups show others the 
                                                          
7
 With reference to the destabilising potential of certain memories, Gerard Namer (1993) spoke about negative memories. 
As is well-known, this topic was also developed by Adorno in his celebrated 1959 conference entitled Was bedeutet: 
Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit? (Adorno, quoted in Olick, 2003b: 259). 
8
 Cultural pragmatics is a vital step in the implementation of the so-called ‘strong program in cultural sociology’ put 
forward some years ago by Alexander and Philip Smith (2003). As a brief summary, it can be said to constitute a 
corrective of the excessive importance attributed to the issue of symbolic meaning in the program at the expense of the 
subject of action (Eyerman, 2004:  29). For a placement of the pragmatic swing in the spectrum of cultural sociology see 
Cossu (2006). For an in-depth consideration of cultural pragmatics carried out by Alexander himself see Cordero, 
Carballo and Ossandòn, (2008: 523-533). For a heated critique of the culturalist framework developed by the Yale 
sociologist, see McLennan, (2004, 2005). McLennan is answered in Alexander, (2005). 
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sense of their social situation (Alexander 2004a: 529)9. This process presents itself as open: the 
performance may succeed, as in this case, where a ‘fusion’ of public identities with the identity 
displayed by the actors takes place, or fail, when the actors’ identity does not cross the barriers that 
separate it from the identities that belong to its audience. Alexander has identified the reason why 
performances are always risky in the organisation of the symbolic structures that characterise 
modern societies. It is impossible to think of the latter as equipped with a single collective identity. 
Unlike pre-modern societies, modern societies are characterised by the fact that they have no 
identity: they are said to be complex precisely because they are depicted as containers of a plurality 
of identity-making configurations (Heller, 2001). However, the more collective identities there are 
within a society, the more extensive and dynamic its symbolic horizons will be and the more 
difficulties there will be in building successful performances (Alexander 2004a: 566-67). 
Let us return to the topic of background symbols and foreground scripts. In order to explain the 
meaning of these concepts, Alexander (2004a: 530) draws on the beginning of Marx’s Eighteenth 
Brumaire (2005, p. 1), where it is stated that  
 
«The tradition of all dead generations weighs like an alp upon the brain of the living. At the very time 
when men appear engaged with in revolutionizing things and themselves, in bringing about what never 
was before, at such very epochs of revolutionary crisis do they anxiously conjure up into their service the 
spirits of the past, assume their names, their battle cries, their costumes to enact a new historic scene in 
such time-honored disguise and with such borrowed language. Thus did Luther masquerade as the 
Apostle Paul; thus did the Revolution of 1789-1814 drape itself alternately as Roman Republic and as 
Roman Empire, nor did the Revolution of 1848 know what better to do than parody at one time the year 
1789, at another the revolutionary traditions of 1793-95»  
 
It seems unnecessary to add anything further: in order to show their identity to themselves 
(Giesen, 2006: 329) and others, collective actors develop interpretations of the past which are 
condensed into scripts that provide the plot of the performance. The difference between 
‘underlying’ representations and ‘surface’ scripts is reminiscent of the distinction between social 
memory, taken as the outline of past identities, and collective memories, taken as representations 
that form the basis of identities in a kind of nascent state. 
What is it that determines the success of a performance? Which element decrees that the 
audience accept and confirm the situation shown by the actors and then identify with it? First of all, 
in order to be successful the actors themselves need to perceive the identity they are going to 
represent as authentic. In other words, in order for the message contained in the script to reach the 
audience and for its collective memory potential to be spread, identification, or rather cathexis, is 
required between the social actors and the script. Furthermore, performances cannot ignore the 
audience. Precisely because it can be defined as a differentiated presence, separated from the group 
of actors, the purpose of the performance can be understood in terms of cultural extension, that is to 
say the abolition of emotional, symbolic and cognitive (or identity-making) dissonance that 
distinguishes an actor and his audience to the greatest possible extent. The cathexis that needs to be 
created between actor and script therefore also needs to be extended to the audience (Alexander, 
2004a: 530-31)10. 
A number of fundamentally important external factors naturally also contribute to the formation 
of the identification processes referred to above. These pertain to actors possessing adequate 
symbolic means to carry out the performance11, the availability of the space required to carry it out, 
the level of cultural differentiation of the audience to whom it is addressed and the structure of 
external social powers (of distribution and interpretation)12. Despite the complex nature of the 
                                                          
9
 The debate has not yet produced a common definition of the concept of performance. For a brief discussion of its 
different ‘souls’ see Cossu (2006: 642-643). 
10
 Here we encounter once again what was previously hinted at with regard to the identification process (see note 2). 
Indeed, the theory of cultural pragmatics seems to manage to keep together both classification-related and emotional 
aspects that Brubaker and Cooper (2000) see as implicit in processes of identity formation.  
11
 Emblematic in this respect is Goffman’s concept of an ‘identity kit’, which establishes all those devices (clothes, 
cosmetics, various kinds of accessories) through which people manipulate their ‘personal façade’ (Goffman, 1961b).  
12
 Certain performances will be given greater visibility, just as the content of certain scripts will be decoded by the 
interpretative elite (journalists, intellectuals, politicians, critics etc.) more favourably than others.  
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factors which contribute to determining the success of the performance, it is interesting to note that 
Alexander repeatedly uses the adjective ‘seamless’ to define a successful performance (Alexander 
2004a: 529, 540, 548, 564, 567). A successful performance is therefore one which manages to 
conceal the signs of the ‘welding’ needed to hold all of its elements together. In brief, it is inferred 
that an effective performance is essentially a complex well-structured communicative operation 
that manages to come across as authentic and spontaneous.  
The keyword here, which Alexander draws on from Hungarian psychologist Mihaly 
Csikszentmihalyi (1975), is flow. A successful performance involves actors and spectators in an 
emotional cognitive dimension reminiscent of Durkheim’s collective effervescence13. On one hand, 
the actors who experience the flow seem to forget the symbolic nature of their actions. The 
distinction between an internal state of consciousness and external social action is found to be as 
insignificant as the presence of external observers seems to be. For these reasons Turner (1986) 
writes that flow entails a loss of ego and speaks about it as a state of fusion between action and 
awareness. Using Goffman’s terminology, it could be said that those who experience flow find 
themselves in a condition of total absorption in the role (Goffman, 1961a). On the other hand, 
however, spectators can (and must) also find themselves in a condition of flow. Seen through the 
eyes of the audience, this experience consists of forgetting the artificial nature of the performance 
and, most of all, external reality for as long as it lasts.   
To complete the picture, it should be remembered that the concept of performance does not 
coincide with the definition of action. The subject of the action does not experience the condition 
of flow; there is a strictly dual reality. The act which he carries out is not only planned in advance 
but is also subjected to reflexive monitoring while being executed. On the contrary, however, a 
performance lays claim to a purely evenemential nature, as it has to come across as spontaneous 
and unrelated to any planning or strategy (Rauer, 2006: 262). Here, as we have seen, an actor’s 
inner reality has to appear to manifest itself and be accounted for completely in the meanings 
transmitted by the performative act. In certain respects, it could be said that all boundaries between 
internal and external realities or, to draw on Goffman again (1959: 127 et seq.), between front and 
back regions, seem to be removed in the performance context. However, Alexander firmly stresses 
the complexity of the work needed to reach the outcome of a successful performance, namely the 
removal of the dualism that in ordinary situations characterises the existence of the actors as much 
as of the members of the audience, (development of the script, means of symbolic production, 
power etc.)14. As a testament to this, he refers to Bourdieu’s comments with regard to artistic taste: 
a virtuoso of aesthetic judgement presents his awareness of the field of art as if it were natural, 
keeping the demanding nature of the long painstaking training needed to acquire this type of 
expertise hidden from those he comes into contact with (Bourdieu, quoted in Alexander, 2004a, p. 
549). 
The point which needs to be stressed is the ability of the script used by the successful 
performance to affect the structure of background representations, becoming an integral part of 
their structure. Performances are ‘symbolic apparitions’ which consequently only last for an 
instant. Nevertheless, if they succeed in their aim of transmitting their actors’ sense of identity to 
the spectators, the result may be a clear transformation of social reality. A particularly good 
                                                          
13
 To avoid any misunderstandings, we must remember that performances and rites are not the same thing. First of all, 
Alexander believes that the term ritual can only be used with regard to particularly successful performances. While 
Schechner (1986: 7-8) feels that rituals lie at the heart of every performance, Alexander (2004a: 534) affirms the exact 
opposite. Secondly, unlike ritual practises, which often ignore or even do not tolerate the presence of spectators, 
performances are characterised precisely through their need for an audience in order to be carried out. This audience has 
an ambivalent status compared to the group of actors: it cannot be assimilated into the position of ‘outsider’ or even fully 
into the role of ‘insider’. This hybrid placement opens audiences to the possibility of being intrigued by a reality which 
they do not contribute to in terms of formation – the one represented by the actors – but with which they may end up 
identifying (Giesen, 2006: 343-48). 
14
 This may be considered to be the point of greatest friction between the points of view developed by Alexander and 
Bernhard Giesen (2006, 2004a, 2004b: 34-36). While the former feels that any ‘foundationalist’ option (Santoro, 2006: 
12) tends to be rejected in favour of the pre-eminence of social construction processes, the latter reserves an ‘ontic’ 
foundation for reality, on which the fabric of representations and interpretations is modelled (Alexander and Mast, 2006: 
18). 
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example of this can be found in the analysis carried out by Valentin Rauer (2006) regarding the 
tribute paid by German Chancellor Willy Brandt to the Jews killed during the Warsaw Ghetto 
Uprising in December 1970. Brandt knelt down in front of the monument and stayed immobile in 
that position for a few minutes. With the help of the huge press presence and a large political 
entourage, the act caused a massive stir in the media and had a profound impact on German and 
international civil society, thereby managing to transform the meaning of German identity 
completely. While prior to that moment Germany had been perceived as the victim of Nazi 
madness and Soviet violence, Chancellor Brandt managed to demolish this representation through 
his performative act and introduced the issue of the German people’s awareness of their collective 
guilt and sorrow for the atrocities committed against Jewish victims (Rauer, 2006: 276). The 
interesting thing is that while on one hand the media initially compared Brandt’s act to Henry IV 
genuflecting at Canossa, it later became a kind of symbolic model referred to in order to build new 
scripts or drafts for ceremonial reconciliation practices (Rauer 2006: 259)15. 
It therefore follows that a cultural pragmatic approach to memory, which focuses on the role 
played by performance in the construction of representations of the past and the identities that they 
enable, cannot be accounted for completely within a ‘presentist’ trend. On the contrary, it seems to 
combine more effectively with a path-dependence approach that sees past and present joined in a 
relationship of reciprocal influence. Indeed, according to this perspective the structures of 
previously developed memories constitute both constraints and resources for the development of 
successive memories (Olick, 1999b: 381-82; 2003a: 8)16. 
The discussion developed thus far now enables us to review and expand on the distinction 
between collective memory and social memory. With regard to what has been shown about 
performance, mechanisms clearly emerge which directly implicate the processes regarding memory 
and oblivion. That is to say, the more actors forget reappropriations and creative elaborations 
applied to the system of background representations to develop the script, the more they identify 
with it. In the same way, the more the audience forgets the artificial nature of the performative act, 
the greater the possibility is that the meanings it conveys are viewed as authentic. In the briefest 
possible terms, the more the constructed nature of collective memory is forgotten, the more its 
identity-making potential is deployed, while contrastingly, the more it is remembered, the more 
improbable it is that such reworkings of the past are able to support coherent images of the 
individual and/or collective self.  
If all this somehow sounds plausible, the concept of social memory can therefore be attributed 
with further semantic value; it should not only indicate the set of representations of the past at the 
heart of the identities of groups which are no longer present, but also and above all awareness of 
the artificial nature of every memory and every identity.  This is not all: social memory is 
understood as widespread awareness of the gap between signifier and signified, between the ‘I’ and 
the ‘Me’, between genuine self-reference (that is to say identity in the strict sense of the term) and 
the performative devices used to convey it in interaction with oneself and others (Giesen, 2006: 
329)17. 
In a certain sense the dynamics between collective memory and social memory exemplify the 
ambivalent destiny reserved for the idea of authenticity from the post-modern age onwards. On one 
                                                          
15
 Indicative of this is the fact that on 6 December 2000  a monument was unveiled in a Warsaw square dedicated to 
Willy Brandt not far from the Ghetto in memory of what is now called Warschauer kniefall (‘Warsaw genuflection’) in 
the presence of Chancellor Gerhard Schröder (Ensink and Sauer, 2003: 85). Kneeling down to ask for forgiveness for 
crimes committed by the people represented now seems to be an extremely widespread ritual formula in the field of 
diplomatic relations. Just as I am finishing this article, Serbian President Boris Tadic has performed a step-by-step 
repetition of the script of apologies staged more than forty years ago in the Polish capital by Willy Brandt during a visit 
to Vukovar, a city which was the scene of one of the most heinous massacres of Croat civilians by Serb soldiers in 
November 1991.  
16
 From an analytical point of view, for Jeffrey Olick the structures of past memories can be considered to be constraints 
when they operate in a mythical sense and exercise their power on the present. On the contrary, they can be considered to 
be resources when they are configured as symbolic instruments used by (and in) the present to restructure one’s own 
mnemonic assets (Olick, cit. in Cossu, 2006: 320). 
17
 The moments of fusion referred to by Alexander can be understood in terms of a form of oblivion which ‘happens’ in 
the field of social memory as defined above. 
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hand the increasingly mediated (and mediatised) nature of social issues seems to increase the need 
for reality desperately, making authenticity the most precious and sought-after characteristic in 
social relations and identities (Huyssen, 1995: 32). On the other hand, however, it seems to be 
impossible to escape from the cultural reflex, conditioned in a manner of speaking, which always 
leads to identifying underlying traces of artificiality and affectation (Cordero, Carballo and 
Ossandòn, 2008: 531). As an ontological category, authenticity seems to progressively turn into an 
interpretative category which appears to be increasingly separable from an ontological transcendent 
referent (Alexander and Mast, 2006: 7). 
 
 
3. Conclusion: sceptical tolerance and sceptical identities 
 
In this essay an attempt has been made to question the relationship between memory and 
identity. The analysis seems to have led us to a twofold result. First of all, we have become aware 
of the fact that the problems that memory causes identity are not simply a question of content. It is 
undoubtedly true that the sudden re-emergence of something ‘repressed’ may destabilise the 
structure of an identity. Coming to terms fully with the past and revising ‘awkward’ episodes from 
it is an objectively threatening undertaking for consolidated identities and the start of faltering 
processes of reworking the self18. Nevertheless, it is also true that memory plays a destabilising role 
when it refers more to the procedures related to its development than to the content of the identity, 
or when it makes individuals and groups aware of the socially-constructed nature of their identity.  
Secondly, if this is true, it is therefore possible to think of a further reduction in the mechanisms 
of alternation between memory and oblivion. Once again, these are not only concerned with the 
concrete content of social representations of the past, but also directly affect the level of their 
development. To put it another way, in order for an identity to be formed and maintained, it is not 
enough to forget episodes from the past which could eventually call it into question. Its signic or 
fictional nature also needs to be overlooked and awareness of the ongoing processes required to 
form and maintain it must also be forgotten. It therefore becomes possible to rework the social 
memory and collective memory pairing as a result. While the latter – to borrow language from the 
cultural pragmatics theory – refers to an identification, or rather a fusion, between script, actor and 
audience, social memory prefigures the memory of the artifice needed to achieve it. It could be said 
that it presents itself as a mishap, a trifle, a detail out of place that can interrupt the performance 
flow and thereby crush the identities supported by it.  
One can conclude that the relationship between social and collective memory is a zero sum one. 
Or to better put it, it is a relationship governed by what Foucault (2004: 32) in a completely 
different context has called the revolving door principle: when social memory gets in, collective 
memory has to get out and vice versa. But I’m not sure things are exactly in that way. I’m tempted 
to think that the logic that could and maybe should govern identity building is close to what George 
Orwell has defined doublethinking (Orwell, 19542).  
In the totalitarian world described in the novel 1984, Big Brother’s party is committed to 
maintaining and increasing its power through the mammoth undertaking of altering reality and the 
past. This consists of modifying any event that might contradict the party’s political line by 
systematically falsifying documents which contain a description of it (articles in the press, 
photographs, film clips, administrative circulars, etc.). However, even such widespread censorship 
                                                          
18
 This kind of practices seems nowadays well developed for reasons and causes that transcend the aims of this article. 
Suffice it to say that coming to terms fully with the past is not a work conducted only at individual level. On the contrary 
it seems to be an effort marking very different collective entities such as states, churches, political parties, ethnic 
communities and so on. As I have already stressed, in referring to this topic Gerard Namer (1993) has proposed the 
concept of negative memory, alluding to the reflexive reconsideration of the past implied by this kind of memory work. 
On similar basis, Jeffery Olick (2007) has more recently proposed to define the current wave of apologies as a politics of 
regret. That is a politics that finds the roots of its legitimation in its capacity and willingness to identify its own mistakes 
and repair the pain caused by them. It is clear that both the concepts of negative memories and politics of regrets imply a 
reconsideration of the past and a reflexive work on the (collective) self. Nevertheless, the kind of reflexivity I am talking 
about must be conceived in different terms. That is as a consciousness about the procedures of social construction needed 
by every kind of self (not just the penitent one) for its formation and maintenance. 
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is not sufficient, as individuals are also required to forget that it has been adopted. A party 
intellectual knows how his memories have been treated and therefore knows that he has been 
involved in the manipulation of reality. Nevertheless, the practice of doublethinking makes him 
believe that reality has not been violated. He forgets that reality has been tampered with to believe 
in the narration built up as a result and, as soon as a new change occurs, he promptly forgets what 
was seen as certain a moment before to embed the new belief in the mind: «even in using the word 
doublethinking it is necessary to exercise doublethinking. For by using the word one admits that 
one is tampering with reality; by a fresh act of doublethinking one erases this knowledge: and so on 
indefinitely» (Orwell, 19542: 171). It can easily be deduced from this that a similar procedure must 
be both conscious and unconscious at the same time; conscious because otherwise it could not be 
applied with sufficient precision and unconscious because otherwise it would give rise to a 
situation of falsehood in the individual along with a sense of unbearable guilt.  
The reference to doublethinking inevitably draws us into the gloomy atmosphere which 
characterises Orwell’s novel. However, this must on no account lead us to make the mistake of 
considering the dynamics between social memory and collective memory in morally negative 
terms. On the contrary, it is felt that greater awareness of the socially-constructed nature of 
identities can foster a new form of tolerance thus creating a stronger barrier against the concurrent 
spread of new forms of fundamentalism. The conception of tolerance I have in mind has been 
illustrated by Adam Seligman in the last chapter of his book Modernity’s Wager (2000). For 
Seligman, real tolerance acts have to be directed toward ideals, values, conducts and identities 
viewed as profoundly deplorable (ivi: 210). It follows that the concept of tolerance implies a strong 
tension between our moral commitment and our willing to accept and respect values and belief that 
we consider as wrong. The risk here is to turn tolerance into indifference. That is to make tolerance 
coincide with a complete lack of interest toward the other and his identity. In my view, what it has 
been said about social and collective memory could foster a different conception of tolerance, a 
conception in which tolerance is not based on reciprocal indifference but on a process of mutual 
recognition guided by humility. 
Indeed, the discussion I have tried to develop has defined authenticity as one of the most 
precious and sought-after characteristic of self and social relations. Nevertheless, as we have seen, 
it seems to be a cultural conditioned reflex that pushed us to look for signals of artificiality. Well, it 
must be said that this kind of attitude can be and must be reflexive, that is it must be applied firstly 
toward our own identities. What I am trying to say is that a greater and reflexive awareness of the 
socially-constructed nature of each identities can create the basis for a new and more radical form 
of tolerance. Being aware of the social construction procedures needed to acquire and maintain 
one’s own identity – in searching for that I thinking that a great effort should be sustained by mass 
media and by schools –  means adopting an attitude of what Seligman (2000: 218) has defined 
sceptical tolerance, a tolerance based on scepticism directed above all at one’s own identity, a form 
of tolerance towards other identities developed using the humility of one’s own identity as the 
starting point. The conscious and unconscious memory of the socially-constructed nature of one’s 
identity inevitably strengthens this form of scepticism, contributing to consolidate the basis of this 
new radical form of tolerance, which is so urgently needed.  
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